

Message Text

PAGE 01 STATE 177722 TOSEC 080087

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ORIGIN SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 CCO-00 /026 R

DRAFTED BY IO:WBBUFFUM/IO/UNP:POAKLEY/CCCUTTER:DD

APPROVED BY IO:WBBUFFUM

NEA:ALATHERTON

S/S: JPMOFFAT

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O 282349Z JUL 75 ZFF4

FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO USDEL SECRETARY IMMEDIATE

S E C R E T STATE 177722 TOSEC 080087

EXDIS

E.O. 11652:GDS

TAGS:OVIP (KISSINGER, HENRY A.), UN, IS, PFOR

SUBJECT: ACTION MEMORANDUM - ISRAELI UNGA SUSPENSION:

US OPTIONS

(S/S NO. 7515304)

FOR THE SECRETARY FROM BUFFUM

1. THE PROBLEM: IN VIEW OF INCREASING MOVEMENT BY ARABS TO PUSH ISRAELI SUSPENSION FROM UNGA, WE NEED TO DECIDE HOW DEPT SHOULD REACT, IN ORDER TO FORESTALL STRONGER CONGRESS-
IONAL ACTION, AND TO BE ABLE TO COORDINATE POSITION WITH EUROPEANS AND OTHERS. IO AND NEA RECOMMEND THAT WE ANNOUNCE WE WILL PARTICIPATE ONLY IN UNGA MEETINGS OF MAJOR CONCERN TO US, E.G., KOREA, DISARMAMENT, UNEF AND UNDOF FINANCING, WHILE BOYCOTTING OTHERS WHICH ARE OF LESS IMPORTANCE.

2. BACKGROUND: THE ARAB CAMPAIGN TO SUSPEND ISRAEL FROM THE GA HAS GAINED MOMENTUM BY RESOLUTIONS OF THE ISLAMIC FOREIGN MINISTERS IN JIDDA AND THE OAU COUNCIL OF MINISTERS IN KAM-
SECRET

PAGE 02 STATE 177722 TOSEC 080087

PALA. THESE ARE LIKELY TO BE ENDORSED AND PROPELLED BY THE OAU SUMMIT NEXT WEEK, AND THE LIMA NON-ALIGNED AUG 25. UNLESS ARAB PERCEPTIONS OF THE PROSPECTS FOR MOVEMENT IN THE ME NEGOTIATIONS CHANGE ARAB ATTITUDES, THE ISSUE COULD ARISE

AT THE 30TH UNGA SEPT 16 OR EVEN SOONER AT THE 7TH SPECIAL SESSION SEPT 1.

IT IS STILL NOT CLEAR EXACTLY HOW AND WHEN ISSUE WILL ARISE IN NEW YORK NOR HOW MUCH SUPPORT ARABS WOULD HAVE. TACTICS WILL PROBABLY BE DECIDED UPON AFTER LIMA AND THE ARAB LEAGUE MEETING SEPTEMBER 1, AND BE DETERMINED BY THE EXTENT OF SUPPORT OF THE NON-ALIGNED, INTER-ARAB POLITICS AND THE STATE OF MIDDLE EAST NEGOTIATIONS. IT IS DOUBTFUL THAT A NEW INTERIM EGYPTIAN-ISRAELI AGREEMENT IN SINAI WOULD IN ITSELF BE SUFFICIENT TO DEFUSE THIS ISSUE COMPLETELY. THE SYRIANS ARE SUSPICIOUS THAT SUCH AN AGREEMENT WILL BE DESIGNED TO FREEZE THE SITUATION ON ALL OTHER FRONTS AND, AS THE PRIME MOVERS BEHIND THE "EXCLUDE ISRAEL" DRIVE, ARE UNLIKELY TO BE DETERRED IN THE ABSENCE OF REAL PROSPECTS FOR MOVEMENT ON THE GOLAN FRONT OR TOWARDS AN OVERALL SETTLEMENT. IF THE SYRIANS PERSIST IN THEIR EFFORTS, OTHER ARAB GOVERNMENTS CANNOT BE EXPECTED TO TAKE A PUBLIC STAND IN OPPOSITION TO THEM.

NEEDLESS TO SAY, WE ARE MAKING, AND WILL CONTINUE TO MAKE, EVERY EFFORT TO ASSURE THERE IS NO FURTHER CRYSTALLIZATION OF SUPPORT FOR THE ARAB POSITION AND WOULD MAKE AN ALL-OUT EFFORT TO DEFEAT ANY SUSPENSION OR EXPULSION PROPOSAL AT THE UN.

CONCEIVABLY THE ISSUE COULD ARISE AS EARLY AS THE 7TH SPECIAL SESSION WHERE BOUTEFLIKA WILL BE PRESIDENT AND WHERE HE WILL APPOINT THE MEMBERS OF THE CREDENTIALS COMMITTEE AS HE WILL ALSO DO FOR THE 30TH GA. HOW BOUTEFLIKA ALLOWS MOVES ON ISRAELI SUSPENSION TO DEVELOP AT THE 7TH SPECIAL SESSION WILL INVOLVE MAJOR POLITICAL DECISIONS FOR HIM AS SUSPENSION OF ISRAEL AT THAT TIME WOULD IMPERIL HIS STRATEGY OF USING THE UN TO ACHIEVE HIS ECONOMIC GOALS.

SECRET

PAGE 03 STATE 177722 TOSEC 080087

EVEN IF NO ACTION IS TAKEN AT THE 7TH SPECIAL SESSION, THE ISSUE COULD STILL ARISE AT THE 30TH UNGA. THE CREDENTIALS COMMITTEE WILL BE APPOINTED BY BOUTEFLIKA BEFORE THE NEW PRESIDENT TAKES OVER. THE REJECTION OF SOUTH AFRICA'S CREDENTIALS LAST YEAR HAS SET A PRECEDENT. (YOU WILL RECALL THAT WE MADE A STRONG SPEECH PROTESTING THE ACTION BUT CONTINUED TO PARTICIPATE IN THE SESSION.) THE TIMING OF SUCH ACTION IS UNCERTAIN. IT IS ALSO POSSIBLE THAT THE ARAB BLOC WILL DECIDE TO GO DIRECTLY TO A FLOOR RESOLUTION, WHICH COULD RANGE FROM EXCLUSION FROM THE CURRENT ASSEMBLY TO A RECOMMENDATION TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL FOR EXPULSION; IN THE LATTER CASE "MODERATES"

COULD VOTE ENTHUSIASTICALLY KNOWING THE SECURITY

COUNCIL WOULD NOT ACT.

SINCE THIS ISSUE COULD ARISE AS EARLY AS SEPT 1,
AND SINCE THE EUROPEANS HAVE REQUESTED TO DISCUSS THE
ISSUE WITH YOU, WE HAVE PREPARED THE FOLLOWING OPTIONS.
WE NEED TO BE PREPARED TO RESPOND QUICKLY AND ENERGETI-
CALLY WHENEVER THE ISSUE ARISES AT THE GA TO GIVE
CREDENCE TO US STATEMENTS THAT WE VIEW MOVES TO
EXCLUDE ISRAEL MOST SERIOUSLY. IN MAKING YOUR
DECISION, IT IS IMPORTANT TO BEAR IN MIND THAT WE HAVE
IMPORTANT STAKES IN UN ACTIVITIES SUCH AS PEACEKEEPING
AND THAT BASICALLY WE ARE RESPONDING TO UNWISE ACTIONS
OF INDIVIDUAL MEMBER STATES CONCERNED, PARTICULARLY
THE RINGLEADERS, RATHER THAN TO AN INSTITUTIONAL
DEFECT (SYG WALDHEIM IS, IN FACT, WORKING HARD TO DETER
SUCH ACTIONS). IN ADDITION, IT WOULD OF COURSE BE
DESIRABLE THAT THE US NOT APPEAR TO BE THE SOLE DEFENDER
OF ISRAEL. WHILE WE CAN EXPECT A SIGNIFICANT NUMBER
OF NEGATIVE VOTES AGAINST SUSPENSION BY THE EUROPEANS,
IT WOULD BE MOST ADVANTAGEOUS TO US IF THERE IS AGREEMENT
AMONG LIKE-MINDED MEMBERS FOR THEM TO TAKE PARALLEL
ACTION IN THE WAKE OF SUCH A MOVE. THAT IS, WHICHEVER
OPTION YOU CHOOSE, IT WOULD BE EXTREMELY HELPFUL TO
HAVE AS MANY FRIENDS AS POSSIBLE JOIN US IN COMMON
ACTION AND ANNOUNCE THEIR ACTIONS PRIOR TO THE VOTE.
HERE WE MUST RECOGNIZE THAT THE MORE FAR REACHING OUR
SECRET

PAGE 04 STATE 177722 TOSEC 080087

MOVE, THE FEWER FRIENDS WILL BE LIKELY TO GO ALONG
WITH US.

I HAVE LIMITED THE CHOICE OF OPTIONS TO THOSE THAT
DO LEAST DAMAGE TO OTHER VITAL INTERESTS. FOR EXAMPLE,
IT IS ESSENTIAL THAT WE CONTINUE TO PARTICIPATE IN
THE SECURITY COUNCIL TO PROTECT OUR VITAL INTERESTS
THERE.

WHATEVER OPTION YOU CHOOSE, WE WOULD, OF COURSE,
MAKE A FORCEFUL SPEECH IN THE ASSEMBLY EXPLAINING OUR
ACTION AND PERHAPS ALSO ONE ADDRESSED TO THE AMERICAN
PUBLIC. THE OPTIONS SHOULD ALSO BE CONSIDERED IN LIGHT
OF THE FACT THAT, IN UN TERMS, WE COULD AFFORD TO
REACT MORE SHARPLY TO ANY SUSPENSION ACTION IN THE
7TH SPECIAL SESSION THAN IN THE REGULAR SESSION, SINCE
IT IS OF SHORT DURATION AND INVOLVES INTERESTS MORE
IMPORTANT TO THE LDC'S THAN TO US. IN THE REGULAR
SESSION, WE WOULD WISH TO PROTECT OUR INTERESTS ON
VITAL ISSUES SUCH AS FINANCING UNEF AND UNDOF AND
PROTECT OUR POSITION ON OTHER IMPORTANT MATTERS SUCH
AS KOREA AND NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION. IF THE ACTION

OCCURS DURING THE 7TH SPECIAL SESSION OR AT THE END OF THE 30TH UNGA, IT WOULD MAKE IT POSSIBLE TO BOYCOTT THE SESSION COMPLETELY WITH LESS NEGATIVE IMPACT ON OUR INTERESTS. (THE POSSIBILITY OF POSTPONING A SUSPENSION MOVE BASED ON CREDENTIALS IN THE 30TH GA NOW APPEARS REDUCED BY THE LIKELIHOOD THAT SOUTH AFRICA WILL ATTEND THE 30TH GA, THUS PROVOKING AFRICAN PRESSURE FOR AN EARLY CREDENTIALS REPORT FOLLOWING LAST YEAR'S MODEL.)

3. OPTIONS

THE MAJOR OPTIONS ARE:

A. COMPLETE BOYCOTT OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY MEETINGS.

B. LOWERING OF OUR LEVEL OF PARTICIPATION IN GA.

SECRET

PAGE 05 STATE 177722 TOSEC 080087

C. SELECTIVE PARTICIPATION IN GA MEETINGS.

D. FINANCIAL RETALIATION AGAINST UN.

E. MAKING A STRONG STATEMENT, WALKING OUT OF MEETING WHERE ACTION TAKES PLACE, BUT THEN RESUMING PARTICIPATION.

F. RETALIATION IN OUR BILATERAL RELATIONSHIPS WITH PERPETRATOR NATIONS.

A. COMPLETE BOYCOTT: THE UNITED STATES COULD IMMEDIATELY WITHDRAW ITS DELEGATION FROM THE GA AND ANNOUNCE WE WOULD NOT PARTICIPATE IN ANY FURTHER MEETINGS DURING THE CURRENT SESSION.

PROS:

-- DEMONSTRATE DRAMATICALLY OUR STRONG DISAPPROVAL.

-- FORCE OTHER MEMBER STATES TO FOCUS ON CURRENT PROCEDURES AND TACTICS WHICH UNDERMINE THE CHARTER AND THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE ORGANIZATION.

-- WOULD DRAMATICALLY DEMONSTRATE TO CONGRESS AND THE AMERICAN PUBLIC THAT WE ARE TAKING A STRONG ACTION TO DEFEND ISRAEL'S RIGHTS IN THE UN.

-- WOULD SHOW TO THE WORLD WE ARE WILLING TO DEFEND INTERESTS OF OUR FRIENDS.

CONS:

-- US WOULD NOT BE PRESENT TO DEFEND OTHER VITAL INTERESTS, E.G. UN PEACEKEEPING, KOREA, DISARMAMENT.

-- WOULD BE CONSIDERED OVER-REACTION BY VAST MAJORITY OF MEMBERS OF UN AND HAVE ADVERSE EFFECT ON OUR RELATIONS WITH THIRD WORLD.

-- PULLING OUT OF THE GA WOULD REDUCE OUR POLITICAL SUPPORT EVEN IN SECURITY COUNCIL WHERE NO RESOLUTION
SECRET

PAGE 06 STATE 177722 TOSEC 080087

OR DECISION CAN BE ADOPTED WITHOUT NON-ALIGNED VOTES.

B. LOWERING OF OUR LEVEL OF PARTICIPATION: AN ALTERNATIVE TO OUR COMPLETE WITHDRAWAL FROM UN ACTIVITIES WOULD BE TO LOWER OUR LEVEL OF REPRESENTATION, FOR EXAMPLE BY WITHHOLDING PARTICIPATION BY ANY OF OUR FIVE AMBASSADORS AT THE UN.

PROS:

-- WOULD CONSTITUTE A SYMBOLIC GESTURE OF OUR DISAPPROVAL WITH THE ACTION BY DOWNGRADING THE DEGREE OF OUR PARTICIPATION IN GENERAL ASSEMBLY MEETINGS.

-- WHILE DEMONSTRATING OUR DISAPPROVAL, WE WOULD STILL BE ABLE TO DEFEND OUR POINTS OF VIEW ON MATTERS OF VITAL INTEREST.

CONS:

-- WOULD NOT BE AS DRAMATIC A DEMONSTRATION OF OUR DISAPPROVAL AS TOTAL WITHDRAWAL AND MIGHT BE CONSIDERED AN INADEQUATE RESPONSE BY US PUBLIC OPINION.

-- COULD REDUCE THE CREDIBILITY AND EFFECTIVENESS IN THE GA OF OUR EFFORTS ON SUCH IMPORTANT MATTERS AS KOREA.

C. SELECTIVE PARTICIPATION: ANNOUNCE WE WILL PARTICIPATE ONLY IN MEETINGS OF MAJOR CONCERN TO US, E.G., KOREA, DISARMAMENT, UN PEACEKEEPING FORCES, WHILE BOYCOTTING OTHERS WHICH ARE OF LESS IMPORTANCE TO US.

PROS:

-- THIS WOULD BE MORE EMPHATIC STEP THAN OPTION B

BUT WOULD AT SAME TIME PERMIT US TO PROTECT OUR INTERESTS WHERE CRUCIAL ISSUES ARE AT STATE.

SECRET

PAGE 07 STATE 177722 TOSEC 080087

CONS:

-- WOULD BE CONSIDERED EXCESSIVE REACTION BY MANY MEMBERS.

D. FINANCIAL RETALIATION: THE RANGE OF ACTION AVAILABLE TO US IN THE FINANCIAL AREA IS QUITE BROAD. WE WOULD NOT WISH TO VIOLATE OUR OBLIGATIONS TO PAY THE ASSESSED CONTRIBUTIONS, SINCE WE ARE LEGALLY BOUND UNDER THE CHARTER TO PAY THEM (ALTHOUGH THE CONGRESS MIGHT DECIDE TO REDUCE OR ELIMINATE EVEN THE ASSESSED CONTRIBUTIONS REGARDLESS OF OUR COMMITMENTS AS THEY DID WITH UNESCO.) HOWEVER, WE COULD REDUCE OUR VOLUNTARY CONTRIBUTIONS TO ONE OR MORE OF THE UN PROGRAMS SUCH AS THE UN DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM, THE UN CHILDREN'S FUND.

PROS:

-- A CLEAR INDICATION OF OUR DISAPPROVAL.

-- WOULD BRING HOME TO SMALLER NATIONS THE UNDESIRABILITY OF RASH ACTION ON STRICTLY POLITICAL ISSUES WHICH THEN ADVERSELY AFFECTS THEIR OWN ECONOMIC INTERESTS.

-- WOULD BE SEEN BY CONGRESS AND AMERICAN PUBLIC AS DIRECT AND EFFECTIVE RETALIATION.

CONS:

-- NOT IMMEDIATELY GERMANE TO GENERAL ASSEMBLY ACTION.

-- WOULD HAVE INDISCRIMINATE, ACROSS THE BOARD EFFECT, ESPECIALLY ON THE MOST NEEDY COUNTRIES, WHETHER OR NOT THEY SUPPORTED THE ARAB MOVE.

-- COULD SEVERELY DISRUPT OUR RELATIONS WITH THE THIRD WORLD NATIONS.

SECRET

PAGE 08 STATE 177722 TOSEC 080087

-- STRONG POSSIBILITY EXISTS THAT OPEC NATIONS WOULD PICK UP OUR CONTRIBUTIONS TO DEMONSTRATE THAT WE ARE NOT INDISPENSABLE.

E. MAKE STRONG STATEMENT, WALK OUT OF MEETING WHEN ADVERSE VOTE TAKEN, BUT CONTINUE TO PARTICIPATE IN FUTURE MEETINGS.

PROS:

-- FIRST WALKOUT OF US DELEGATION FROM A GENERAL ASSEMBLY SESSION WOULD ATTRACT CONSIDERABLE PUBLICITY, DRAMATIZING OUR DISPLEASURE WITH THE ACTION.

CONS:

-- WOULD BE CONSIDERED BY ISRAEL AS INSUFFICIENTLY STRONG RESPONSE WITH SIMILAR CONGRESSIONAL REACTION.

F. RETALIATION IN BILATERAL RELATIONSHIPS: IF IT WERE DECIDED TO ADOPT RETALIATORY MEASURES AGAINST THOSE COUNTRIES VOTING AGAINST US ON THE ISRAELI REPRESENTATIONS ISSUE, WE WOULD PROBABLY WANT TO SINGLE OUT THE RINGLEADERS FOR SPECIAL TREATMENT. WITH THESE COUNTRIES, WE COULD CONSIDER THE FULL RANGE OF POSSIBILITIES SUCH AS CUTTING ALL ECONOMIC AND MILITARY ASSISTANCE, FOOD AID AND OTHER HUMANITARIAN AID, ATTEMPTING TO BLOCK IBRD LOANS AND STOPPING ALL EXPORT-IMPORT BANK LOANS. WE COULD ALSO RECALL OUR AMBASSADORS.

IN THE CASE OF THOSE COUNTRIES WHO VOTED AGAINST US BUT WERE NOT DEEPLY INVOLVED IN ORGANIZING THE OPERATION, WE COULD CONSIDER APPLYING A LESSER DEGREE OF RETALIATION.

PROS:

-- WOULD BE ANOTHER HIGHLY DRAMATIC WAY OF DEMONSTRATING OUR DISAPPROVAL TO BOTH UNITED NATIONS AND PUBLIC OPINION.

-- MIGHT RESULT IN A FEW COUNTRIES CHANGING THEIR
SECRET

PAGE 09 STATE 177722 TOSEC 080087

POSITION ON REPRESENTATION ISSUE.

CONS:

-- COULD CAUSE MAJOR DISRUPTION IN US BILATERAL RELATIONS WITH COUNTRIES SUCH AS SYRIA WE VIEW AS ESSENTIAL TO OTHER ASPECTS OF OUR FOREIGN POLICY.

-- WOULD BE VIEWED BY MANY NATIONS AS A PETTY REACTION TO AN ISSUE ON WHICH WE DO NOT HAVE OUR WAY.

-- WOULD BE CONTRASTED WITH OTHER MAJOR POWERS' BEHAVIOR WHEN THEY HAVE LOST ON KEY ISSUES IN THE UN.

-- AT TIME WE ARE DISRUPTING OUR MULTILATERAL
LINES OF COMMUNICATION, WE WOULD ALSO BE DISRUPTING
OUR BILATERAL CHANNELS.

4. BUREAU VIEWS

OF THE VARIOUS CHOICES OPEN TO US, IO & NEA BELIEVE THAT
THE ONE WHICH MOST NEARLY MEETS ALL OF OUR INTERNATIONAL
AND DOMESTIC POLITICAL REQUIREMENTS IS OPTION C--A
DECISION TO WALK OUT OF THE MEETING WHERE A DECISION
IS TAKEN TO SUSPEND OR EXPEL ISRAEL COUPLED WITH AN
ANNOUNCEMENT THAT WE WOULD PARTICIPATE ONLY IN THOSE
SESSIONS OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY ON ITEMS WHERE WE
CONSIDERED MAJOR AMERICAN INTERESTS ARE INVOLVED.
FOR STRONGER EFFECT, WE COULD COMBINE THIS WITH ELEMENTS
OF OPTION D, I.E., INDICATE THAT THE US WILL REDUCE
ITS VOLUNTARY CONTRIBUTIONS TO VARIOUS UN PROGRAMS
(LEAVING OPEN WHICH PROGRAMS AND HOW MUCH OF A REDUCTION).

IF YOU SELECT THIS OPTION, I BELIEVE IT PREFERABLE
TO WITHHOLD FOREKNOWLEDGE OF THIS DECISION. SINCE IT
WOULD BE TAILORED TO A RATHER NARROW US DEFINITION OF
WHEN WE WOULD PARTICIPATE, IT WOULD NOT COMMAND SIGNI-
FICANT SUPPORT FROM OTHER COUNTRIES. HOWEVER, THIS
OPTION WOULD CONSTITUTE A LOGICAL AND SIGNIFICANT
RESPONSE ON OUR OWN PART, AND COULD HEAD OFF MORE
DRASTIC ACTION MANDATED BY CONGRESS. MEANWHILE, WE
SECRET

PAGE 10 STATE 177722 TOSEC 080087

STILL HAVE THE POSSIBILITY OF EXPLOITING THE UNCERTAINTY
OF WHAT OUR REACTION WILL BE AS SET FORTH IN YOUR
MILWAUKEE SPEECH.

IF, HOWEVER, YOU CHOOSE ONE OF THE MORE FAR-REACHING
RESPONSES, SUCH AS COMPLETE NON-PARTICIPATION OR WITH-
HOLDING FINANCIAL SUPPORT, THEN I BELIEVE IT PREFERABLE
TO ADVISE OUR FRIENDS IN ADVANCE TO SEE WHETHER WE CAN
OBTAIN SOME SIGNIFICANT COMPANY.

5. RECOMMENDATION

THAT YOU APPROVE OPTION C--SELECTIVE PARTICIPATION
ONLY IN MEETINGS OF MAJOR CONCERN TO US, E.G., KOREA,
DISARMAMENT, UN PEACEKEEPING FORCES, WHILE BOYCOTTING
OTHERS WHICH ARE OF LESS IMPORTANCE.

APPROVE DISAPPROVE

6. CLEARED: NEA:ATHERTON INGERSOLL

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Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: Z
Capture Date: 26 AUG 1999
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: TOSEC, POLICIES, EXPULSION, RELATIONS WITH INTERNATIONAL ORGS
Control Number: S7515304
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 28 JUL 1975
Decaption Date: 28 MAY 2004
Decaption Note: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Authority: CunninFX
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 28 MAY 2004
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1975STATE177722
Document Source: ADS
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: IO:WBBUFFUM/IO/UNP:POAKLEY/CCCUTTER:DD
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: 11652 GDS
Errors: n/a
Film Number: D750260-0445
From: STATE
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1975/newtext/t197507107/baaaaqlu.tel
Line Count: 433
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE, TEXT ON MICROFILM
Office: ORIGIN SS
Original Classification: SECRET
Original Handling Restrictions: EXDIS
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 8
Previous Channel Indicators:
Previous Classification: SECRET
Previous Handling Restrictions: EXDIS
Reference: n/a
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Authority: CunninFX
Review Comment: n/a
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 21 MAY 2003
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review History: RELEASED <21 MAY 2003 by ShawDG>; APPROVED <03 OCT 2003 by CunninFX>
Review Markings:

Margaret P. Grafeld
Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
06 JUL 2006

Review Media Identifier:
Review Referrals: n/a
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: n/a
TAGS: OVIP, PFOR, IS, XF, US, UN, (KISSINGER, HENRY A)
To: SECRETARY
Type: TE
Markings: Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 06 JUL 2006